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Introduction
In the aftermath of Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall1
and its progeny, the circuits are still divided as to the meaning and
1. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)
(holding that the petitioner’s contacts with Texas were insufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and hence to allow
the Texas court to assert in personam jurisdiction over petitioner). "The one trip to Houston
by petitioner’s chief executive officer for the purpose of negotiating the transportation
services contract cannot be regarded as a contact of a ‘continuous and systematic’ nature,
and thus cannot support an assertion of general jurisdiction." Id.
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application of the terms "arise out of" or "related to" in specific jurisdiction
analysis. While the Supreme Court indicated its reluctance to expound on
these terms,2 several circuits have focused significantly on this language in
adopting and developing their own peculiar jurisdictional methodology in
answer to the perceived discrepancy.3
For the first time in over a quarter of a century, the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari to two cases involving the "stream of commerce" theory
used by state courts to justify lawsuits against foreign companies whose
products end up injuring state residents.4 Whether or not the Court will use
the opportunity to resolve the disagreement among the circuits over the
"arise out of" or "related to" language is unclear. For now, the various
approaches taken by the several circuits in light of these phrases are still in
play, and companies will have to remain wary of when and where they will
be subject to jurisdiction.
The purpose of this article is to argue for a single jurisdictional
standard, using textualism as a way to understand the meaning of the "arise
out of" or "relates to" language. At present, there is no single standard.
Instead, the circuits have responded to the problem by borrowing different
tests from tort law to measure a defendant’s activity within a state.5
Circuits, such as the First and the Eighth, apply the "proximate cause" test,6
while others, such as the Sixth, Seventh, and the Ninth, apply the looser but

2. See id. at 415 n.10 (refusing to define or expound on the differences between
"arise out of" and "related to").
3. See id. (noting that the Court’s decision not to expound results from the fact that
they received no briefing on the issue of specific jurisdiction and plaintiffs stipulated that
this was not a case of specific jurisdiction).
4. See Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 201 N.J. 48, 53 (2010), cert granted,
131 S.Ct. 62 (2010) (acknowledging that the "stream of commerce" theory is applicable);
Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 395 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), cert granted sub nom Goodyear
Lux. Tires S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 63 (2010) (noting that defendants "purposefully injected
their product into the stream of commerce").
5. See infra notes 8–9 (citing cases in which circuit courts determine activity in the
state through the application of various tests).
6. See Pizaro v. Hoteles Concorde, Int’l, C.A., 907 F.2d 1256, 1259 (1st Cir. 1990)
(noting that the court applies a "proximate cause" test to show the liability of the defendant);
Nowak v. Tak How Investments, Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 714–15 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[W]e think the
proximate cause standard better comports with the relatedness inquiry because it so easily
correlates to foreseeability, a significant component of the jurisdictional inquiry."); Sybaritic
Inc. v. Interport Int’l Inc., 957 F.2d 522, 524–25 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
corporation’s contacts with the state were not extensive enough to establish minimum
contacts).
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for test7 to determine a causal relationship between the defendant’s contacts
and the plaintiff’s claim. The Second Circuit does not subscribe to either
test.8 Instead, it employs a test that primarily considers the totality of
circumstances, utilizing a "sliding scale" with general and specific
jurisdiction at diametric endpoints.9
The Third Circuit, however, rejects using a "hybrid" approach,
holding that sliding scale tests are in tension with the Supreme Court’s
distinction between specific and general jurisdiction.10 It considers the
test too variable, because it focuses too much on the quantity and
quality of the defendant’s activity.11 Because a sliding scale test
creates such uncertainty, it makes it difficult for a defendant to know
whether or not it will be subject to jurisdiction.12 Instead, the Third
Circuit created a heightened but for standard, which compensates for
the disparity between the proximate cause and the but for tests, while
maintaining the causation requirement.
The Third Circuit test
7. See Lanier v. American Bd. of Endodontics, 843 F.2d 901, 909 (6th Cir. 1988),
("Whether the decision to discriminate occurred before, during, or after . . . is not controlling
and indeed may well be a contested matter of proof; it arose from, was occasioned by, and
would not have occurred but for the totality of Dr. Lanier’s efforts to obtain board
certification-efforts."); Deluxe Ice Cream Co. v. R.C.H. Tool Corp., 726 F.2d 1209, 1216
(7th Cir. 1984) (noting that without the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, the claim
would not have arose); Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990),
rev’d on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) ("Our circuit . . . implicitly adopted the "but
for" test in analyzing whether a cause of action arises from a defendant’s continuing efforts
to solicit business in the forum state.") "Today, we make its adoption explicit." Id.
8. See Chew v. Dietrich, 143 F.3d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that the court will
not use the but for and proximate cause tests but instead will consider all contacts with the
United States); see also Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 335–36 (D.C.
2000) (explaining that the court will use a loose standard for determining jurisdiction rather
than a strict test); Vons Cos. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 428, 434 (Cal. 1996) (noting
that the D.C. Circuit also applies a "hybrid" approach).
9. See O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel, Co., 496 F.3d 312, 320–21 (3d Cir. 2007)
(criticizing the Second Circuit use of a sliding scale); Del Ponte v. Universal City Dev.
Partners, Ltd., No. 07-CV-2360, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3528, at *37 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 16,
2008) (suggesting that the court apply a sliding scale approach).
10. See O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 320–21 ("[T]he ‘sliding scale,’ ‘substantial
connection,’ and ‘discernible relationship’ tests are not the law in this circuit. . . . ").
"General and specific jurisdiction merge, and the result is a freewheeling totality-of-thecircumstances test." Id.
11. See id. at 321 ("‘[H]ybrid’ approaches allow courts to vary the scope of the
relatedness requirement according to the ‘quantity and quality’ of the defendant’s
contacts.").
12. See id. ("The Due Process Clause is supposed to bring a ‘degree of predictability
to the legal system.’" (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 285,
297 (1980))).
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maintains the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction, and
thus, is in harmony with Supreme Court precedent.
The remaining portion of this article is divided into five parts.
Part I of this comment briefly sets forth the historical background to
personal jurisdiction analysis through Helicopteros. Part II analyzes
the split among the circuits in their interpretation and application of
the above terms. In Part III, the Third Circuit’s approach to
jurisdiction analysis is discussed and analyzed. Part IV supports the
Third Circuit’s test using textualism and suggests a four-step process
as a framework to resolving jurisdictional questions. Finally, Part V
concludes that the Third Circuit test should be adopted as a single,
uniform standard.
PART I: Pennoyer to Helicopteros and the Boundaries of Specific and
General Jurisdiction
The state is a perfect society in the sense of being self-sufficing,
independent, autonomous, and sovereign. It has all it needs to fulfill its
end and depends on no higher society. But its sovereignty is not
absolute, for it is limited by the natural law and the rights of other
13
states.

In the United States, the move away from state autonomy toward
interstate dependence was necessary for the sake of the common good. As
the above provides, national unity requires a quid pro quo—respect for the
rights of other states and the boundaries of their jurisdiction. Jurisdiction
belongs to a state as the extremities belong to the human person; but, like
human extremities, jurisdiction has its limits. Pennoyer v. Neff14 echoed the
fundamental notion of limited jurisdictional reach by one state over
residents of another.15 Although the holding was substantially overruled in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,16 two jurisdictional bases outlined in
13. AUSTIN FAGOTHY, S.J., RIGHT AND REASON 328 (1963).
14. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 728 (1877) (holding that "[n]o person is
required to answer in a suit on whom process has not been served, or whose property has not
been attached").
15. See id. at 715 ("The process of a court of one State cannot run into another and
summon a party there domiciled to respond to proceedings against him."). "Notice sent
outside the State to a non-resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an action against him
personally for money recovery." Id.
16. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that in order to be
subject to personal jurisdiction a party must either be physically present in the forum state or
have established minimum contacts with the state); see also Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733
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Pennoyer survived—presence and citizenship—which continued to act as
the fundamental building blocks of jurisdictional analysis in subsequent
cases. 17
With the rise of the corporation, courts faced new challenges in
analyzing whether they could exercise jurisdiction over a corporate
defendant. The two jurisdictional bases of presence and citizenship were
difficult to apply in such a case.18 A corporation is a fictional person and
has no existence outside the documents that created it.19 It acts through its
personnel instead of on its own, and technology facilitates its ability to
cross state boundaries without physical detection.20 As a result, the courts
developed two theories prior to International Shoe to deal with this
phenomenon: one based on consent and the other based on presence.21
Under the consent theory, the corporation needed the state’s consent to
conduct business, which theoretically would be conditioned on appointing
an agent to receive process.22 If a corporation did not appoint an agent,
consent could only be deemed implied.23 Over time, the courts abandoned
the consent theory in favor of the presence theory,24 most likely because

("Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their
de facto power over the defendant’s person.") "Hence his presence within the territorial
jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding
him." Id.
17. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE—CASES AND MATERIALS 75
(9th ed. 2005) (noting that "presence and citizenship" are jurisdictional bases developed in
Pennoyer); see also, JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY K. KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 3.1 (4th ed. 2005) (noting that under modern-day jurisprudence, the extent of a
court’s jurisdictional power is determined through a "review of the relationship that exists
among the place where the underlying transaction took place, the parties, and the territory of
the state where the suit is brought").
18. See FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., at 75 ("The jurisdictional bases developed in
Pennoyer—presence and citizenship—were not easily applied to corporations.").
19. See id. ("A corporation is . . . a fiction."). "It exists on paper." Id.
20. See id. (noting that "[a] corporation . . . acts through its employees, directors, and
shareholders" and "technology facilitated interstate transport").
21. See id. (stating that the courts were able to adapt the jurisdictional basis from
Pennoyer by developing the theory of "consent" and the theory of "presence").
22. See id. ("The courts first developed the ‘consent’ theory . . . . Under this theory, a
foreign corporation could be required to consent to service of process in the state by
appointing an agent to receive process within the state, as a condition of obtaining
permission to do business there.").
23. See FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., supra note 17 at 75 (stating that when the corporation
failed to appoint an agent it could only have implied consent).
24. See id. ("As the courts became increasingly disenchanted with the unrealistic
nature of the ‘consent’ theory, they developed the ‘presence’ theory.").

"Arise out of" or "Related to"

421

obtaining a corporation’s consent was more convenient in theory than in
practice.
The presence theory similarly became untenable to apply. Under this
theory, a foreign corporation could be served with a summons if it conducts
business in the forum state in a way in which it can properly be deemed
"present" in the state.25 Engaging in this type of inquiry could be an
onerous task. Since the corporation is essentially a legal entity, which lacks
a physical body, determining its "presence" within a state can be
problematic. Moreover, once a corporation ceased to conduct business
within the state, the precursors to jurisdiction evaporated.26 International
Shoe presented a new answer.
There, the Court held that a corporation’s presence could be
determined by the measure of its "contacts" with the forum state.27 They
can be "minimal" (even reduced to one in some cases) provided that the
"quality and nature" of the activity justifies maintenance of a lawsuit so as
not to offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."28 In
25. See Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917) ("A foreign
corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in the absence of consent,
only if it is doing business within the state . . . as to warrant the inference that it is present
there."). "And . . . the process will be valid only if served upon some authorized agent." Id.
26. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 17 at 76 ("Under the presence theory . . . a
court lost its adjudicatory authority over a corporation once it ceased doing business in the
state.").
27. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (noting that in order to satisfy due process, a
corporation’s presence within a state can "be manifested only by activities carried on in its
behalf" by the corporation’s agents).
To say that the corporation is so far "present" there as to satisfy due
process requirements, for purposes of taxation or the maintenance of
suits against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the question to be
decided. For the terms "present" or "presence" are used merely to
symbolize those activities of the corporation’s agent within the state
which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due
process. Those demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation
with the state of the forum as make it reasonable . . . . An "estimate of
the inconveniences" which would result to the corporation from a trial
away from its "home" or principal place of business is relevant in this
connection.
Id. at 316–17.
28. See id. at 319 (satisfying due process "must depend . . . upon the quality and nature
of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws" rather than the
quantity of contacts).
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
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later cases, the Court clarifies how contacts are ascertained within the
dichotomous spheres of specific and general jurisdiction; but, without
doubt, International Shoe stretched the reach of the long arm of the law
beyond requiring physical presence as held earlier.
In the early 1980s, the Court culminated its jurisdictional teachings in
Helicopteros. The case is a landmark decision not only for its stance on
general jurisdiction, but for its "arise out of or related to" test for specific
jurisdiction.29 There, a group of United States citizens working for an oil
pipeline contractor were killed in a helicopter crash in Peru.30 The
defendant, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. ("Helicol"), a
Columbian corporation, provided helicopter transportation services for
workers of oil and construction companies throughout South America.31 At
the time of the crash, the plaintiffs were employed by Consorcio, a Peruvian
consortium. 32 Consorcio, based in Texas, was formed in compliance with
Peruvian law for the purpose of constructing a pipeline in Peru.33
Helicol’s involvement began with a trip by its president to Houston to
negotiate over prices and the availability of his company’s helicopter
services to the consortium.34 Eventually, a contract was executed in Peru
and substantial justice. . . ." It is evident that the criteria by which we
mark the boundary line between those activities which justify the
subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be
simply mechanical or quantitative. The test is not merely, as has
sometimes been suggested, whether the activity, which the corporation
has seen fit to procure through its agents in another state, is a little more
or a little less. Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon
the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process
clause to insure.
Id.
29. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414–15 (discussing jurisdiction based on
controversies relating to or arising out of a defendant’s contacts with the forum).
30. See id. at 409–10 ("On January 26, 1976, a helicopter owned by Helicol crashed in
Peru. Four United States citizens were among those who lost their lives in the accident.").
31. See id. at 409–10 ("Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. (Helicol), is a
Colombian corporation . . . engaged in the business of providing helicopter transportation for
oil and construction companies in South America.").
32. See id. at 410 (noting that Consorcio was in fact an alter ego of Williams-SedcoHorn, a combination of Williams International Sudamericana, Ltd., a Delaware corporation;
Sedco Construction Corporation, a Texas corporation; and, Horn International, Inc., a Texas
corporation).
33. See id. (noting that Peruvian law provides only Peruvian companies could work on
the pipeline).
34. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 410 ("Consorcio . . . needed helicopters to move
personnel, materials, and equipment into and out of the construction area."). "In 1974, upon
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detailing the terms of the negotiation in Spanish on Peruvian government
stationary.35 Of particular importance, the contract indicated that all the
parties were Peruvian residents, and according to the contract’s consent to
jurisdiction clause, the Peruvian courts were the venue for all controversies
arising out of any breach.36
The Court began its analysis with the rule summarized as follows: in
personam jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant corporation does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice when a
controversy is related to or arises out of a defendant’s contacts with the
forum.37 In ascertaining those contacts, tribunals should be mindful that the
"‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation’ is the
essential foundation of in personam jurisdiction."38 Conversely, "when the
cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation’s
activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State’s
subjecting the corporation to in personam jurisdiction when there are
sufficient contacts between the State and the foreign corporation."39
Helicol’s contacts with Texas included: the negotiation session
between the defendant’s president and the consortium; purchases of
approximately 80% of its helicopter fleet and spare parts from Bell
Helicopter in Fort Worth, Texas, between 1970 and 1977; sending pilots to
Texas for training; sending management to Bell Helicopter to familiarize
themselves with the plant; and reception of $5 million in payments from
Consorcio drawn upon a local Houston bank.40 There were no other
request of Consorcio/WSH, the chief executive officer of Helicol, Francisco Restrepo, flew
to the United States and conferred in Houston with representatives of the three joint
venturers." Id.
35. See id. ("Helicol began performing before the agreement was formally signed in
Peru on November 11, 1974."). "The contract was written in Spanish." Id.
36. See id. at 411 ("[T]he residence of all the parties would be Lima, Peru . . .
controversies arising out of the contract would be submitted to the jurisdiction of Peruvian
courts.").
37. See id. at 414 ("Due process requirements are satisfied when in personam
jurisdiction is asserted over a nonresident corporate defendant that has ‘certain minimum
contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’").
38. Id.
39. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
40. See id. at 411 (noting Helicol’s other business contacts with Texas).
Aside from the negotiation session in Houston between Restrepo and the
representatives of Consorcio/WSH, Helicol had other contacts with
Texas. . . . [I]t purchased helicopters . . . spare parts, and accessories for
more than $4 million from Bell Helicopter Company in Fort
Worth . . . Helicol sent prospective pilots to Fort Worth for training and

424

17 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 415 (2011)

business contacts between the defendant and the State of Texas; Helicol
was never authorized to do business there and it never had an agent present
for the service of process within the state.41
The Court further found that Helicol never performed any services in
Texas, nor solicited any business or sold any product there.42 Notably, the
defendant never signed any contract in Texas; the contract, instead, was
signed in Peru. 43 Moreover, it never had any employee based in Texas nor
ever recruited any employees there.44 Helicol did not own any property in
Texas, maintained no office or records in Texas, nor did it have any
shareholders there.45 Finally, none of the plaintiffs or their deceased family
members lived in Texas.46
Since the parties conceded that the injuries did not arise out of the
defendant’s contacts, nor were related to any of the defendant’s activities in
Texas, the analysis proceeded under the general jurisdiction rubric.47 In the
end, the Court held for the defendants, finding that the nature of contacts
did not amount to the continuous and systematic general business contacts
as compared to its prior, sister case, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co.48 By contrast, in Perkins, a mining company was sued in Ohio
to ferry the aircraft to South America. It also sent management and
maintenance personnel to visit Bell Helicopter in Fort Worth . . . .
Helicol received into its New York City and Panama City, Fla., bank
accounts over $5 million in payments from Consorcio/WSH drawn upon
First City National Bank of Houston.
Id.
41. See id. at 411–12 (affirming that Helicol had only one business contact with Texas
and "Helicol never has been authorized to do business in Texas and never has had an agent
for the service of process within the State").
42. See id. ("[Helicol] never has performed helicopter operations in Texas or sold any
product that reached Texas, never solicited business in Texas.").
43. See id. (stating that Helicol never signed a contract in Texas).
44. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 411–12 (noting that Helicol "never had any
employee based there, and never recruited an employee in Texas").
45. See id. ("Helicol never has owned real or personal property in Texas and never has
maintained an office or establishment there."). "Helicol has maintained no records in Texas
and has no shareholders in that State." Id.
46. See id. at 412 ("None of the respondents or their decedents were domiciled in
Texas.").
47. See id. at 415 (noting that because Helicol’s actions did not give rise to the cause
of action, a general jurisdictional analysis was necessary).
48. See Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 437 (1952)
(holding that "it would not violate due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment for
Ohio courts either to take or refuse to take jurisdiction of a foreign corporation in action not
arising out of the corporation’s activities within the state"); see also Helicopteros, 466 U.S.
at 415–16 ("We thus must explore the nature of Helicol’s contacts with the State of Texas to
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state court by a non-Ohio resident over claims that had no connection to the
defendant’s contacts in Ohio.49 Benguet, the defendant in the case, was a
foreign company that owned and operated certain gold and silver mines in
the Philippines.50 Looking for safe haven during the Japanese occupation
of the Philippines, Benguet moved its operations to Ohio.51
A suit was filed against Benguet in Ohio for damages arising from the
defendant’s failure to issue stock certificates in the Philippines.52 The trial
court treated Benguet as a foreign corporation conducting business in
Ohio.53 Yet, in contrast to the contacts in Helicopteros, Benguet’s contacts
with Ohio were significant enough to warrant general jurisdiction.54 The
contacts were sufficiently continuous and systematic enough to implicate
that Benguet’s corporation was present in the forum state.55 Therefore, the

determine whether they constitute the kind of continuous and systematic general business
contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins. We hold that they do not."); see also id. at 423–
24 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the findings of the Court and opining that specific
jurisdiction was found without referring to any causal connection to the injury, because the
purchases of helicopters were the same as involved in the crash, availing the protections of
Texas laws).
49. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438–39 (noting that Idonah Perkins was not domiciled in
Ohio but filed a claim in Ohio against Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., who claimed that
the suit did not arise out of actions in Ohio).
50. See id. at 439 ("Among those sued is the Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company."). "It is styled a ‘sociedad anonima’ under the laws of the Philippine Islands,
where it owns and has operated profitable gold and silver mines. Id.
51. See id. at 447–48 (detailing the company’s move during the Japanese occupation
from the Phillipine Islands to Clermont County, Ohio, where the president of the company
maintained an office and did many things on behalf of the company there).
52. See id. at 439 ("In one action petitioner seeks approximately $68,400 in dividends
claimed to be due her as a stockholder."). "In the other she claims $2,500,000 damages
largely because of the company’s failure to issue to her certificates for 120,000 shares of its
stock." Id.
53. See id. (acknowledging "the holding of the Supreme Court of Ohio, not contested
here, that, under Ohio law, the mining company is to be treated as a foreign corporation").
54. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447–48 (noting that in Ohio, the president kept an office
of the company, as well as files, bank accounts including one with the stock of the company,
wrote salary checks, held business meetings, and generally conducted the business of the
company from Ohio during WWII). "Without reaching that issue of state policy, we
conclude that, under the circumstances . . . it would not violate federal due process for Ohio
either to take or decline jurisdiction of the corporation in this proceeding." Id. at 448.
55. See id. at 445 (conducting "continuous and systematic corporate activities as it did
here—consisting of directors’ meetings, business correspondence, banking, stock transfers,
payment of salaries, purchasing of machinery, etc.—those activities are enough to make it
fair and reasonable to subject that corporation to proceedings in personam in that state").
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Court found that it was constitutionally fair and reasonable for the Ohio
courts to exercise jurisdiction if they so choose.56
PART II: The Circuits Are Split: "Proximate Cause," "But For," Or
Something Else?
In Helicopteros, the court declined to attach any significance to the phrases
"arise out of" or "relates to," but arguably significance exists.57 While it seems
that the Court in Helicopteros intended to teach what is not contemplated by the
Constitution in terms of general jurisdiction,58 the case simultaneously had a
remarkable effect on the formula for specific jurisdiction. In total, looking at the
case in context with surrounding decisions, such as International Shoe, Hanson v.
Denckla,59 and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,60 it appears that an argument
can be made that the Court has indeed provided sufficient, if imperfect, guidance
as to the limits of each jurisdictional theory, which is why, perhaps, it never
reviewed another case. Not everyone agrees, however. Courts across the land
have found there to be little guidance from the Supreme Court, at least from the
standpoint of the specific jurisdiction teaching in Helicopteros. 61 As a result,
each circuit adopted its own test to ascertain when an injury "arose from" or
"related to" a defendant’s contact.

56. Id. at 445.
57. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 n.10 (describing the Court’s decision not to
define the terms "arising out of" and "related to" and declining to define their connection to
one another). The Court continued: [W]e decline to reach the questions (1) whether the
terms ‘arising out of’ and ‘related to’ describe different connections between a cause of
action and a defendant’s contacts with a forum, and (2) what sort of tie between a cause of
action and a defendant’s contacts with a forum is necessary to a determination that either
connection exists." Id.
58. See id. at 416 (deciding that Helicopteros’ contacts are not the "kind of continuous
and systematic general business contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins").
59. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (holding that the Florida court
lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant because minimum contacts with the forum
had not been established and thus did not "purposefully avail" itself to forum law).
60. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475–76 (1985) (holding that
personal jurisdiction is appropriate when the defendant’s contacts with the forum result from
actions by the defendant that create a substantial connection with the forum state).
61. See Del Ponte v. Universal City Dev. Partners, Ltd., No. 07-CV-2360, 2008 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 3528, at *33 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2008) (noting that "[w]ithout explicit guidance
from the Supreme Court, the various Circuits have reached different conclusions on what
standard should be applied in determining whether a claim ‘arises from or relates to’ a
defendant’s contacts with a forum").
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The Proximate Cause Approach
The First Circuit is considered to be the leading circuit applying the
proximate cause test in specific jurisdiction analysis.62 Pizarro v. Hoteles
Concorde Int’l, C.A.63 exemplifies its application. There, the plaintiff, a
citizen of Puerto Rico, was injured at the defendant’s hotel in Aruba, when
an employee accidently knocked into the plaintiff sending her to the floor.64
The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant in the United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico, alleging that the defendant’s hotel
advertisements appearing in a Puerto Rican magazine enticed her to take
the trip.65
The court ruled that the plaintiff’s reliance upon the
advertisements in support of its claim was not the proximate cause66 of the
plaintiff’s injuries. Therefore, since the claims did not "arise from" the
defendant’s contacts, the court declined to take jurisdiction over the case.67
The result of the First Circuit’s approach appears cut-and-dry, but its
application is not always predictable, however. By comparison to Pizarro,
in Nowak v. Tak How Investments, Ltd.,68 the First Circuit remarkably
62. See Nowak v. Tak How Inv. Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715 (1996) ("This circuit, whether
accurately or not, has been recognized as the main proponent of the proximate cause
standard.").
63. See Pizarro v. Hoteles Concorde Int’l., C.A., 907 F.2d 1256, 1256 (1990) (holding
that "the defendant’s solicitation of business in Puerto Rico by placing nine advertisements
in a Puerto Rican newspaper did not vest the Puerto Rican court with personal jurisdiction
over the defendant").
64. See id. at 1258 (noting that "Ivette was injured at the hotel when, according to the
complaint, ‘an employee of the Aruba Concorde Hotel came running in the direction of the
plaintiffs, and due to his negligence . . . skidded and hit plaintiff Ivette Ramos, causing her to
fall to the floor’").
65. See id. (noting that due to the advertisements in Puerto Rico she "learned of the
hotel, and decided to visit").
66. See id. at 1259 ("Whether certain events ‘arise out of’ a nonresident defendant’s
actions within Puerto Rico is comparable or analogous to whether certain actions can be said
to be the legal, or proximate cause of injuries suffered by a plaintiff.").
67. See id. at 1260 (noting that the court focused on the "arise out of" language in
adopting the proximate cause test); see also Mark M. Maloney, Specific Personal
Jurisdiction and the "Arise From or Relate To" Requirement . . . What Does It Mean?, 50
WASH & LEE L. REV. 1265, 1283–84 (1993) (contending that the First Circuit as applied the
proximate cause standard from a reading of the entire phrase).
68. See Nowak v. Tak How Inv. Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715 (1996) (holding that defendant
personally availed himself of the forum state through his solicitation and that the defendant’s
contacts with the forum were sufficiently related to the forum to assert personal jurisdiction).
This circuit, whether accurately or not, has been recognized as the main
proponent of the proximate cause standard. We think the attraction of
proximate cause is two-fold. First, proximate or legal cause clearly
distinguishes between foreseeable and unforeseeable risks of harm.
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tempered its strict use of the proximate cause test. The facts were similar to
Pizzaro, but the results were strikingly different. In Nowak, a woman
drowned in a pool at a Hong Kong hotel owned by the defendant.69 Her
husband brought suit in Massachusetts federal court on behalf of himself
and his wife alleging that the hotel’s faxed-solicitation to his employer for
discounted room-rates set in motion the fatal trip.70 The plaintiff’s
company, Kiddie Products, arranged with the defendant, Tak How, to fly
the plaintiff and his wife to the defendant’s hotel through those
solicitations.71
The First Circuit held that the Massachusetts court had jurisdiction
over the Hong Kong entity, notwithstanding a lack of proximate cause
between the contacts and the claims.72 This time the court did not ignore
that solicitations and promotional materials evidenced an "on-going
relationship" between the two companies.73 The court found that strictly
adhering to one test, as in this case a proximate-cause test, was too
restrictive, opining that: "[W]e intend to emphasize the importance of

Foreseeability is a critical component in the due process inquiry,
particularly in evaluating purposeful availment, and we think it also
informs the relatedness prong. . . . Adherence to a proximate cause
standard is likely to enable defendants better to anticipate which conduct
might subject them to a state’s jurisdiction than a more tenuous link in
the chain of causation. Certainly, jurisdiction that is premised on a
contact that is a legal cause of the injury underlying the controversy—
i.e., that "forms an ‘important, or [at least] material, element of proof’ in
the plaintiff’s case,"—is presumably reasonable, assuming, of course,
purposeful availment. . . . A "but for" requirement, on the other hand,
has in itself no limiting principle; it literally embraces every event that
hindsight can logically identify in the causative chain.
Nowak, 94 F.3d at 715 (citations omitted).
69. See id. at 711 ("A Massachusetts resident who accompanied her husband on a
business trip to Hong Kong drowned in their hotel’s swimming pool."). "Plaintiffs later
brought this wrongful death diversity action against the Hong Kong corporation that owns
the hotel." Id.
70. See id. (noting that the defendants decided to stay at the hotel based on a
promotion received by defendant’s employer and that this is in addition to about 15,000
solicitations sent to previous guests throughout Massachusetts).
71. See id. (remarking that all arrangements were made through Kiddie Products).
72. See id. at 716 ("While the nexus between Tak How’s solicitation of Kiddie
Product’s business and Mrs. Nowak’s death does not constitute a proximate cause
relationship, it does represent a meaningful link between Tak How’s contact and the harm
suffered.").
73. See Nowak, 94 F.3d at 717 (noting that "it may be said that the materials were sent
as part of an on-going relationship between the two companies").
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proximate causation, but to allow a slight loosening of that standard when
circumstances dictate."74
Regardless of the anomalous result of Nowak, proximate cause
analysis is still generally the standard in the First Circuit, but in this case
the court needed to loosen the standard under the circumstances.75 Here,
the First Circuit found for jurisdiction by appearing to be remarkably
leaning toward applying a but for test, holding that:
If the resident is harmed while engaged in activities integral to the
relationship the corporation sought to establish, we think the nexus
between the contacts and the cause of action is sufficiently strong to
survive the due process inquiry at least at the relatedness stage. This
76
concept represents a small overlay of "but for" on "proximate cause."

74. Id. at 716.
75. See id. at 717 ("[S]trict adherence to a proximate cause standard in all
circumstances is unnecessarily restrictive."). The court continued:
The concept of proximate cause is critically important in the tort context
because it defines the scope of a defendant’s liability. In contrast, the
first prong of the jurisdictional tripartite test is not as rigid: it is,
"relatively speaking . . . a ‘flexible, relaxed standard.’" We see no
reason why, in the context of a relationship between a contractual or
business association and a subsequent tort, the absence of proximate
cause per se should always render the exercise of specific jurisdiction
unconstitutional. When a foreign corporation directly targets residents
in an ongoing effort to further a business relationship, and achieves its
purpose, it may not necessarily be unreasonable to subject that
corporation to forum jurisdiction when the efforts lead to a tortious
result. The corporation’s own conduct increases the likelihood that a
specific resident will respond favorably. If the resident is harmed while
engaged in activities integral to the relationship the corporation sought to
establish, we think the nexus between the contacts and the cause of
action is sufficiently strong to survive the due process inquiry at least at
the relatedness stage. This concept represents a small overlay of "but
for" on "proximate cause." In a sense it is a narrower and more specific
identification of the Seventh Circuit’s formulation for jurisdictionworthiness of claims lying ‘in the wake’ of commercial activities in the
forum. It may be that other kinds of fact patterns will be found to meet
the basic factor of foreseeability, but we have no occasion here to
pronounce more broadly.
Id. See also O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 319 (noting that the First Circuit employs a proximate
cause in most cases, but allows for a slight loosening of the standard at appropriate times).
76. Nowak, 94 F.3d at 715–16 (finding the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable when a
corporation achieves its purpose of targeting residents for business and that business results
in a tortious injury).
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The Eighth Circuit, like its sister circuit,77 also uses the proximate
cause test, as exemplified in Sybaritic, Inc. v. Interport Int’l, Inc.78 There,
Sybaritic, a fitness equipment manufacturer from South Dakota, with its
principal place of business in Minnesota, filed suit in Minnesota federal
court against Interport, a Californian exporter of American products to
Asia, seeking damages arising from their business relationship.79 In 1989,
Interport’s president contacted Sybartic about an advertisement he saw in a
magazine regarding one of their face-lift products.80 Sybaritic sent him
information about its other products and invited him to inspect the plant.81
In December of that year, Interport’s president accepted that offer.82
Eventually after a series of phone calls and other communications, a
deal was struck in Japan for Interport to act as Sybaritic’s agent there and to
For reasons not
sell its products to Interport’s Japanese contacts.83
disclosed in the case, Sybartic brought an action in state court to declare the
agency contract void.84 Interport removed the case to federal district court
on diversity grounds and simultaneously moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.85 The district court granted the motion.86 The Eighth
Circuit upheld the district court’s order dismissing the complaint, finding
that one trip by the defendant to Minnesota with a purpose to inspect the
plant and subsequent telephone and mail communications was "too few in
number and too attenuated" from the claim to "support jurisdiction."87
Furthermore, the contract was negotiated, drafted and executed in Japan,
and thus had no connection to Minnesota.88
The proximate cause test as applied by the First and Eighth Circuits
could support a theory that adoption of such a test can arguably be divined

77. See id. at 715 (describing the Eighth Circuit as using a proximate cause standard);
see also Chew, 143 F.3d at 29 (describing the Eighth Circuit as using a proximate cause
standard).
78. See Sybaritic, Inc. v. Interport Int’l, Inc., 957 F.2d 522, 524–25 (8th Cir. 1984)
(holding the defendant’s contacts to be too attenuated and unrelated to the cause of action
and thus declining to exercise jurisdiction).
79. Id. at 523.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Sybaritic, 977 F.2d at 523.
84. Id. at 524
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 525 (affirming the district court upon agreement with its analysis).
88. Sybaritic, 977 F.2d at 525.
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through a natural reading of the "arise out of" language.89 The term "arise
out of" does connote a level of rigidity and a stricter jurisdictional causal
connection for tort claims. Such stringency, however, does not resonate
well with the other courts. As an alternative, the but for test is used by
several circuits, including the Sixth, the Seventh, and the Ninth, because of
its broad application.90 Although the Sixth and the Seventh Circuits have
tests with different names—"the made possible test" and the "lies in the
wake test," respectively—both tests are seen, at least by the Third Circuit,
as essentially but for tests.91
Circuits That Apply the "But For" Test
The Sixth Circuit demonstrates the use of the but for test in jurisdiction
analysis in Lanier v. American Bd. of Endodontics.92 The facts surround a
Michigan dentist who sued the national dental board for denying her
certification to practice a specialty.93 She alleged sex discrimination.94 The
contacts basically amounted to phone calls, the sending and returning of
application packets, and correspondence advising her that she failed the
licensing exam.95 Michigan’s long-arm statute conferred limited personal
jurisdiction if the defendant "transact[ed] any business" within the state.96
89. See infra notes 192–205 and accompanying text (observing that the Third Circuit
applies an arising out of test that mirrors the language of the proximate cause test).
90. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 379–80 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d
on other grounds 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (aligning the Ninth Circuit with the Fifth and the
Sixth Circuits in noting that the proximate-cause test adopted by the First Circuit and Eighth
is to rigid a test.) The Court found the proximate-cause test too limiting and observed
instead, the but for test "preserves the essential distinction between general and specific
jurisdiction." Id. See also O’Connor v. Sandy Lane, 496 F.3d 312, 322 (3rd Cir. 2007)
(observing that the but for test has "no limiting principle" (citing Shute and Nowak)).
91. See O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 319 n.8 (labeling the Sixth Circuit and Seventh Circuit
tests "but for"); Del Ponte v. University City Dev. Partners, Ltd., No. 07-CV-2360, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3528, at *36 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2008) ("Despite their titles, the ‘made
possible’ and ‘lies in the wake’ tests essentially describe ‘but for’ tests.").
92. See Lanier v. American Bd. of Endodontics, 843 F.2d 901, 903 (6th Cir. 1988)
(finding jurisdiction "constitutionally fair" where party defendants purposefully availed
themselves of the laws of the forum); see also Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville v. Wedge
Group, Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1091 (6th Cir. 1989) (signaling a movement way from the
"made possible by" test to focus on the cause of action having a "substantial connection" to
the defendant’s in-state activities—a test also criticized by the Third Circuit).
93. Lanier, 843 F.2d at 903.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 907.
96. Id. at 908.
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The court essentially found that a but for relationship existed between the
claim and the contacts:
Whether the final decision to discriminate was made in Illinois, or
Arizona, or elsewhere, it must necessarily have arisen from the Board’s
assessment of facts it obtained as a result of its contacts with Dr. Lanier
in Michigan, and but for which Michigan contacts it would not have
acted upon her application at all and thus would not have made the
discriminatory decision . . . . Clearly the cause of action herein, if one
exists, arose from, was "made possible" by . . . the application process,
97
much of which occurred in Michigan.

The court was satisfied that the Board transacted a sufficient amount
of its business with the plaintiff and held there to be jurisdiction in
Michigan.98 As previously stated, the Seventh Circuit uses a similar
approach, but phrases it differently: "[I]f the cause of action ‘lies in the
wake’ of the business transaction, it arises from it."99 The following case
exemplifies how this standard can be applied to a contract cause of action.
In Deluxe Ice Cream Co. v. R.C.H. Tool Corp.,100 the defendant, a
Netherlands corporation operating out of California, was sued in Illinois by
a purchaser of ice cream making equipment made by an Illinois-based
manufacturer for damages arising from a breach of contract.101 The
defendant’s business was negotiating deals between manufacturers and
purchasers throughout the western United States and Europe.102 The
plaintiff, a resident of Oregon, claimed breach of implied and express
warranties for defects in the equipment.103 The Seventh Circuit found
jurisdiction over the defendant based on meetings between the defendant

97. Id. at 909; see also Nowak, 94 F.3d at 714 (noting that the Sixth Circuit test
involves a but for relationship); Chew, 143 F.3d at 29 (stating the belief that the difference
between the relatedness test and the but for test is not "as stark as it may first appear").
98. See Lanier, 843 F.2d at 908 ("[J]urisdiction lies where any transaction of business
gives rise to a cause of action."). The court continued:
"Contract negotiation and formation are business transactions. It is of no
moment, for purposes of determining the existence of jurisdiction, what type of
cause of action arises from a business transaction under Mich[igan l]aws . . . ."
Id.
99. See Nowak, 94 F.3d at 714 (noting that the Seventh Circuit suggests a "but for"
relationship); Chew, 143 F.3d at 29 (finding similarity between the different tests used by the
different Circuits).
100. See Deluxe Ice Cream Co. v. R.C.H. Tool Corp., 726 F.2d 1209, 1216 (7th Cir.
1984) (finding minimum contacts satisfied from the business relationship in the forum state).
101. Id. at 1210–12.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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and the manufacturer in Illinois, which constituted sufficient contacts
giving rise to the contract between the plaintiff and the manufacturer.104
The contract, therefore, lay in the wake of Bates’ commercial activities in
Illinois, and the defendant was subject to jurisdiction.105
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit adopted the but for test in the renowned
case of Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines.106 The plaintiff in Shute filed suit in
Washington for damages relating to "slip and fall" injuries sustained while
on one of the defendant’s cruise ships.107 The contacts constituting
purposeful availment consisted of advertisements, mailings, solicitations,
and seminars held by Carnival with travel agents throughout the State of
Washington.108
While citing persuasive authority from the First and Eighth Circuits,
the defendant contended that the plaintiff’s slip and fall claim did not "arise
out of" the defendant’s solicitations, and thus defeated a finding of
jurisdiction.109 The court agreed that if it were to apply the "arise out of"
analysis using proximate cause as applied in other circuits, it would have to
find that the Shutes’ injuries did not "arise out of" the solicitations in
Washington, but from the defendant’s activity on the ship.110 Considering
that the proximate cause test applied in other circuits would "unnecessarily
[limit] the ordinary meaning of the ‘arising out of’ language," the court
used the but for test instead, since it is more "consistent with the basic
function of the ‘arising out of’ requirement, thus preserving the essential
distinction between general and specific jurisdiction."111 Causality is still a
104. See id. at 1216 (finding the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the
requirements of due process).
105. See Deluxe Ice Cream, 726 F.2d at 1216 (finding the defendant amenable to suit
under the Illinois long arm statute); Chew, 143 F.3d at 29 (noting that the Eighth Circuit’s
test involves a but for relationship).
106. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385–86 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d
on other grounds 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (holding the exercise of jurisdiction proper under the
"but for" test because plaintiffs cause of action arose out of defendant’s contacts and would
not exist but for defendant’s contacts).
107. Id. at 379, 382–83.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 383.
110. See Shute, 897 F.2d at 383 ("Were this court to apply the ‘arising from’ analysis of
Marino and Pearrow to this case, we would conclude that Mrs. Shute’s fall did not arise out
of Carnival’s solicitation of business in Washington." (citing Marino v. Hyatt Corp., 793
F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1986) and Pearrow v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067
(8th Cir. 1983)). Both courts denied jurisdiction since defendant’s contacts were not the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.
111. See Shute, 897 F.2d at 385 (interpreting the "arising out of" language to connote a
but for relationship, while the First Circuit in Pizzaro held there to be a proximate-cause
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required factor for establishing personal jurisdiction, as the court explains,
"[u]nder this test, a defendant cannot be haled into court for activities
unrelated to the cause of action in the absence of a showing of substantial
and continuous contacts sufficient to establish general jurisdiction."112 The
court concluded that but for Carnival’s solicitations, the Shutes would not
have taken the trip and suffered injury.113
The "Sliding Scale" Test
The Second Circuit does not subscribe to either the proximate
cause or but for test; instead, it employs a "sliding scale." 114 The Third
Circuit describes the "sliding scale" test as an approach that conflates
minimum contacts with reasonableness and, as a result, it "allow[s]
courts to vary the scope of the relatedness requirement according to the
‘quality and quantity’ of the defendant’s contacts."115 Under the
sliding scale, causation has no significant impact on the analysis.116
Chew v. Dietrich117 demonstrates the results of using this application.

relationship, further indicating the discrepancy among the Circuits regarding how to interpret
this language).
112. Id. ("The ‘but for’ test preserves the requirement that there be some nexus between
the cause of action and the defendant’s activities in the forum."); see also O’Connor, 496
F.3d at 322 (observing the but for test separates the related from the unrelated); Moki Mac
River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 580 (Tex. 2007) ("Rather than considering
only isolated contacts that relate to a specific element of proof or the proximate cause of the
injury, the but for analysis considers jurisdictional contacts that occur over the ‘entire course
of events’ of the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.").
113. See Shute, 897 F.2d at 386 ("It was Carnival’s forum-related activities that put the
parties within ‘tortuous striking distance’ from one another.").
114. See O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 320–21 (citing Chew as applying a sliding scale test);
Del Ponte, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3528, at *37 n.8 (concluding that Chew applied a sliding
scale test); William M. Richman, Review Essay: Part I—Casad’s Jurisdiction in Civil
Actions, Part II—A Sliding Scale to Supplement the Distinction between General and
Specific Jurisdiction, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1328, 1340–1346 (1984) ("The concepts of general
and specific jurisdiction are simply the two opposite ends of this sliding scale.").
115. O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 321 (citations omitted); Del Ponte v. University City Dev.
Partners, Ltd., No. 07-CV-2360, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3528, at *37 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16,
2008).
116. See O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 319 (observing that under the sliding scale test
"causation is of no special importance").
117. See Chew v. Dietrich, 143 F.3d 24, 30 (2nd Cir. 1998) (finding sufficient contacts
to sustain jurisdiction consistent with due process).
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Bent Dietrich, a German citizen, entered his yacht in a race from
Newport, Rhode Island to Bermuda.118 Chew was one of nine men
Dietrich recruited in Rhode Island through an agent to assist in the
voyage.119 After the crew was assembled, the yacht set sail for the
tropical island.120 On the return trip, the crew encountered choppy seas
throwing Chew overboard into international waters.121 Tragically, his
body was never recovered.122 Chew’s parents sued Dietrich in the
Southern District of New York.123 Dietrich moved to dismiss under
Fed. R. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction but consented to fight
the suit in New York if personal jurisdiction could be established
either in New York or Rhode Island.124 The plaintiffs conceded that
New York did not have jurisdiction over the case; so, the District
Court proceeded to look to Rhode Island and First Circuit authority for
guidance, because it was convinced that the issue involved Rhode
Island law.125 Rhode Island’s long arm statute provided for personal
jurisdiction to the full extent of its Constitution; but, because Rhode
Island case law was silent on the issue, the court looked to the First
Circuit’s treatment of personal jurisdiction, acknowledging its
adoption of the proximate-cause test.126 Because the act of recruiting
Chew was not a proximate cause of his death, the court granted the
motion to dismiss.127
On appeal, the Second Circuit considered the fact that under
Rhode Island law, the defendant may not be subject to jurisdiction, but
nonetheless opined that under Rule 4(k) there was still jurisdiction
over him as long as subjecting him to suit does not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." 128 The court noted the
split among the circuits over using either the proximate cause test or
118. Id. at 26.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Chew, 143 F.3d at 26.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. (opining that the First Circuit would apply the proximate-cause test in a
case such as the one before the court and observing that the court below also acknowledged
that other circuits apply a but for test, and that the First Circuit at times applied the same
test).
127. Chew, 143 F.3d at 26.
128. See id. at 28 (reviewing one of the court’s recent decisions articulating the
standard for exercising jurisdiction under 4(k) (citations omitted)).
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but for test.129 It took a different stance, concluding that the two tests
are not "dichotomous."130 Instead, the court used a sliding scale test
based primarily on the number of contacts:
It must be remembered that the relatedness test is but a part of a
general inquiry . . . . Where the defendant has had only limited
contacts with the state it may be appropriate to say that he will be
subject to suit in that state only if the plaintiff’s injury was
proximately caused by those contacts. Where the defendant’s
contacts with the jurisdiction that relate to the cause of action are
more substantial, however, it is not unreasonable to say that the
defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction even though the acts
within the state are not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
131
injury.

To the Second Circuit, the constitutional test is met as long as the
analysis involved an examination of the relationship "among the
defendant, the forum and the litigation" and exercising personal
jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."132 So in concluding that there were multiple
contacts by Dietrich in Rhode Island, the court found jurisdiction
because Dietrich: entered Rhode Island with the intent of assembling a
crew to go to Bermuda; recruited Chew through his agent; and
intended to return to Rhode Island "with many of the same crew." 133
Therefore, because Dietrich knew he would be returning with "most of
the crew," he could "reasonably anticipate being ‘haled into court’"
there.134
Following Second Circuit precedent, the district court in Del
Ponte v. Universal City Dev. Partners, Ltd.,135 found jurisdiction over
a foreign kiosk operator as a result of a purchase of a leadcontaminated necklace made by a New York resident vacationing in
Florida. 136 Linda Del Ponte sued the defendants on behalf of her
child, Dominic, who was poisoned by at least one of two lead129. Id. at 29.
130. See id. ("We do not believe that this dichotomy is as stark as it may first appear.").
131. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
132. See Chew, 143 F.3d at 28 (restating the relatedness test (citations omitted)).
133. See id. at 30 (finding Dietrich’s contacts alone enough to allow the exercise of
jurisdiction).
134. Id.
135. See Del Ponte v. University City Dev. Partners, Ltd., No. 07-CV-2360, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3528, at *46 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2008) (holding the balance of "reasonableness
factors" allows for proper exercise of jurisdiction over defendant).
136. Id. at *45.
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contaminated necklaces she purchased from defendant Ray Art at
Universal Studios, Florida.137 The injury occurred when they returned
home to New York. Dominic took hold of the necklaces and began to
chew on them. Routine pediatric tests revealed elevated levels of lead
in his blood.138
The Plaintiffs sued in the Southern District of New York alleging
that Ray Art purchased like-kind necklaces from vendors in New
York.139 Jurisdictional discovery, however, revealed that the only
product in Ray Art’s inventory resembling the offending necklace
came from a Pennsylvania distributor.140 Consequently, Ray Art
submitted that its purchases in New York were completely unrelated to
Dominic’s injuries.141 The Del Pontes countered that even if it were
true that the offending necklace came from Pennsylvania, Ray Art
"obtain[ed] a significant percentage of similar inventory from New
York vendors."142 They argued the district court in New York had
jurisdiction because "the sale that caused injury in New York still
‘relate[d]’ to Ray Art’s business in New York." 143
Ray Art moved to dismiss before the magistrate judge for lack of
personal jurisdiction.144 The magistrate judge issued a report and
recommendation denying the defendant’s motion.145 Subsequently,
Ray Art appealed to the district judge arguing the magistrate judge
erred in finding that purchases of necklaces and related trips in New
York were enough to conclude that Ray Art conducts business in New
York; erred in finding that Ray Art’s contacts with New York
distributors have connection with the injury that took place; ignored
Helicopteros’ precepts where "mere purchases and related trips, even if
occurring at related intervals, are not enough to warrant a State’s
assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation in
137. Id. at *2.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Del Ponte, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3528 at *4, *21, *39.
141. Id. at *39.
142. Id.
143. See id. ("Plaintiffs note that Ray-Art obtains a significant percentage of similar
inventory from New York vendors, and thus argues that the sale [in Florida] that caused
injury in New York still "relates" to Ray-Art’s business in New York."); but see O’Connor,
496 F.3d at 318 ("A Philadelphia vendor may sell a lot of cheese steaks to German tourists,
but that does not mean he has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting
activities within Germany.").
144. Del Ponte, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3528 at *2.
145. Id. at *2.
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a cause of action not related to the purchases;" and, finally, erred in
concluding that a finding of personal jurisdiction over Ray Art
"comport[ed] with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."146
The district court accepted the magistrate’s recommendation and
denied the motion to dismiss.147 Distinguishing the various circuits
above and, at one point, recognizing the Third Circuit as "critical" of
its circuit’s use of the sliding scale, the district court proceeded to
examine the case under the Second Circuit approach.148 Again, under
the test if the defendant has "scant contacts with the forum the court
may demand a proximate cause relation between the . . . contact and
the injury."149 Conversely, if "the defendant has substantial contacts
with the forum (even if not sufficient to establish general jurisdiction)
the court may accept a more attenuated relation" between the contact
and the injury.150 The Court said that, under normal circumstances:
[T]he demonstrated relationship between Plainiffs’ cause of action
and Ray Art’s contacts with New York would not be sufficient to
warrant a finding of specific jurisdiction. However, Ray Art’s
substantial contacts with the New York forum change the calculus.
Under Chew, Ray Art’s consistent activity in New York effectively
lowers the relatedness bar thus permitting a broader interpretation
151
of ‘arise from or relate to.’

The court went on to note that Ray Art’s purchases in New York
"enabled Ray Art to stock the variety of inventory desired by
consumers like the plaintiffs."152 Acknowledging that the contacts
146. Id. at *8.
147. Id. at *45.
148. See id. at *37–38 n.8 (opining that the Second Circuit did not "conflate[] minimum
contacts with reasonableness" but rather adopted the sliding scale to make the analysis easier
for the district courts).
149. Del Ponte, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *36.
150. Id. at *36.
151. Id. at *39–40 (emphasis added).
152. Id. at *40–41 ("While not free from doubt, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ cause of
action relates to Ray-Art’s contacts with the forum.") The court explained further:
Under most circumstances, the demonstrated relationship between
Plaintiffs’ cause of action and Ray-Art’s contacts with New York would
not be sufficient to warrant a finding of specific personal jurisdiction.
However, Ray-Art’s substantial contacts with the New York forum
change the calculus. Under Chew, Ray-Art’s consistent activity in New
York effectively lowers the relatedness bar, thus permitting a broader
interpretation of "arise from or relate to." Because Ray-Art has
purchased a very significant portion of its inventory from New York
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were only "broadly related" to the plaintiff’s claims, the court,
however, found they were "broad enough" to "satisfy the constitutional
requirement of ‘fair play and substantial justice.’"153 The Third
Circuit, however, does not apply such a broad test, and takes a
different view on what constitutes fair play and substantial justice.
PART III: The Third Circuit Presents a More Compelling View Against the
Use of "Sliding Scale" Tests for Jurisdiction
In O’Connor v. Sandy Lane,154 the Third Circuit disagreed with the
Second Circuit’s use of a "sliding scale" test in personal jurisdiction
analysis, distinguishing the law in its circuit.155 Patrick O’Connor, a
Pennsylvania resident, suffered personal injuries from a slip and fall in the
defendant hotel.156 Sandy Lane, a luxury resort hotel, advertised itself as
"the premiere address in the Caribbean" overlooking the "gorgeous crescent
of beach on the Barbados’ western coast."157 On the recommendation of
their friends, who were travel agents, the O’Connors booked a trip to Sandy
Lane through American Express travel services.158 They left for their first
trip to Barbados in late February 2002 and returned to their Pennsylvania
home in early March of that year.159

vendors and its principals have visited New York on a yearly basis, RayArt’s New York contacts have enabled Ray-Art to stock the variety of
inventory desired by consumers such as Plaintiffs . . . . And, as a result
of this activity in New York, Ray-Art could have anticipated becoming a
party in New York courts, either as a defendant or as a plaintiff. Thus,
while Ray-Art’s contacts with the forum may be only broadly related to
the instant cause of action, this broad relation is sufficient to satisfy the
constitutional requirement of "fair play and substantial justice."
Id. See also Chew, 143 F.3d at 30 (noting that the Second Circuit is "at liberty to
decide for [itself, regardless of the authority in other Circuits] what the Due
Process Clause requires to sustain personal jurisdiction.").
153. Del Ponte, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *40–41.
154. See O’Connor v. Sandy Lane, 496 F.3d 312, 325 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding the
exercise of jurisdiction proper where minimum contacts exist and the forum is reasonable
and thus compliant with due process).
155. See id. at 321 (distinguishing "hybrid" approaches from the Third Circuit cases,
which analyze general and specific jurisdiction cases separately).
156. Id. at 315.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 315.
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Afterward, Sandy Lane began mailing the O’Connors seasonal
newsletters.160 Inspired by what they read, the O’Connors decided to book
another trip the following year but, before they departed, Sandy Lane
mailed them yet another brochure, this time describing their state-of-the-art
spa treatments as able to "rejuvenate the mind, body and spirit" and
encouraged scheduling them in advance.161 Subsequent phone calls were
placed both to and from Sandy Lane to schedule and confirm the various
appointments.162
Sometime after the O’Connors arrived at Sandy Lane, Mr. O’Connor
attended a spa treatment.163 After he received the treatment, he was told by
a Sandy Lane employee to step into the shower to wash up.164 Due to
residual treatment oil on his body and a lack of any protective mat on the
shower floor, Mr. O’Connor slipped as he exited the shower and tore his
rotator cuff.165 Consequently, the O’Connors sued Sandy Lane in the Court
of Common Pleas for Philadelphia County for negligence.166
Sandy Lane removed the case to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which eventually dismissed it for lack
of personal jurisdiction.167 On appeal, the Third Circuit exercised plenary
review over the dismissal and ultimately reversed the decision.168
Finding Purposeful Minimum Contacts
The Third Circuit began its examination of the activities between the
parties, recognizing that deliberate targeting of the forum state is the
constitutional standard.169 In so doing, the court considered and affirmed
that "contacts with a state’s citizens that take place outside the state are not
160. See id. (explaining the marketing methods of Sandy Lane Hotel Co.).
161. Id. at 316 (criticizing the Second Circuit use of a sliding scale).
162. See id. (describing the nature of communications between the O’Connors and
Sandy Lane Hotel Co.).
163. See id. (describing O’Connors’ experience at Sandy Lane Hotel).
164. See O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 316 (detailing the circumstances surrounding
O’Connors’ injury).
165. See id. (explaining the causes of O’Connors’ injury).
166. See id. at 316 (detailing the procedural history of the instant case).
167. See id. (explaining the procedural history of the case and its dismissal for lack of
personal jurisdiction).
168. See id. at 315–16 (explaining the Third Circuit’s exercise of plenary review and
ultimate reversal of the case).
169. See O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317 (explaining the court’s focus on interactions
between the parties and Sandy Lane Hotel’s targeting of the forum state (emphasis added)).
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purposeful contacts with the state itself."170 Applying that standard to the
facts of the case, the Third Circuit found that activities such as receiving
recommendations from friends who happen to be travel agents do not
constitute purposeful "contacts" by the defendant-corporation with the
forum state, because Sandy Lane was not a party to those conversations.171
The contacts Sandy Lane made to Pennsylvania, after the O’Connor’s 2002
trip also lacked jurisdictional significance.172 The contacts before the
O’Connor’s third visit, however, were sufficient to support specific
jurisdiction.173
In particular, the mailing of the seasonal newsletters, the brochure
regarding the spa-treatments, and the phone calls were all in furtherance of
"cultivat[ing] the relationship" with the O’Connors.174 The court found that
Sandy Lane used these contacts to form a contract to render spa services,
explaining, "[t]hrough these acts, Sandy Lane deliberately reached into
Pennsylvania to target two of its citizens."175 Thus, "if the O’Connor’s
allegations are true, then they establish purposeful contacts with
Pennsylvania."176
The Third Circuit’s Answer to the "Arise Out Of or Relates To" Conundrum
After identifying the first-prong of the inquiry, the Third Circuit
proceeded to examine whether the claims arose out of or related to at least
one of these contacts. The Third Circuit acknowledged that there is no
consensus among the circuits as to the meaning of the phrase "arise out of
or related to" in specific jurisdiction analysis, because as explained before,
the Supreme Court has not "explained the scope of this requirement."177 As
170. Id.
171. See id. at 317–18 (explaining that non-purposeful contacts by Sandy Lane Hotel
were insufficient to support specific jurisdiction).
172. See id. (explaining the effect of the contacts between the O’Connors and Sandy
Lane).
173. See id. (explaining the jurisdictional significance of the O’Connors’ third visit).
174. O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317–18.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 318.
177. Id. at 316 (criticizing the Second Circuit’s use of a sliding scale); see also
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415–16 n.10 ("We do not address . . . whether the terms ‘arising
out of’ and ‘related to’ describe different connections . . . . "). "Nor do we reach the question
whether, if the two types of relationship differ, a forum’s exercise of personal jurisdiction in
a situation where the cause of action ‘relates to,’ but does not ‘arise out of,’ the defendant’s
contacts with the forum should be analyzed as an assertion of specific jurisdiction." Id.
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a result of the lack of specificity from the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit
noted the three standards used by the various circuits to resolve the
problem.178 It concentrated on the third standard which focuses on hybrid
approaches such as: "[T]he substantial connection test," the "discernible
relationship test," and the "the sliding scale test" used by the Second
Circuit.179 This is the area where the Third Circuit departs from its sister
circuit.
The court observed that hybrid tests, such as the sliding scale, omit the
causation element.180 It found that since this approach considers the
"totality of the circumstances," there is no distinction between general and
specific jurisdiction.181 Contacts are measured quantitatively along a
sliding scale with general and specific jurisdiction at the endpoints.182 As a
result, sliding scale tests used to gauge personal jurisdiction have not been
adopted by the Third Circuit.183
The Third Circuit Considers and Rejects "Hybrid" Approaches as
Inconsistent with Supreme Court Precedent
As stated above, the Third Circuit deemed hybrid approaches too
easily manipulated, offending the separate, dichotomous spheres of specific
and general jurisdiction.184 Consequently, it rejects their use for jurisdiction
analysis.185 The criticism stems from the uncontrolled flexibility of hybrid
tests, which allow courts to "vary the scope of the relatedness requirement"
according to the "‘quantity and quality’ of the defendant’s contacts."186 In
criticizing the Second Circuit’s use of a sliding scale in Chew, the Third

178. See O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 318–20 (detailing the three most popular judicial
approaches: the "proximate cause" or "substantive relevance test, the but for causation test,
and the "substantial connection" or "discernable relationship" test).
179. Id. at 319–21.
180. See id. at 319 ("Unlike the but for test, causation is of no special importance [to the
‘substantial connection’ or ‘discernable relationship’ test.]").
181. Id. at 320.
182. See id. at 321 (explaining that the Third Circuit, unlike others, does not view
general and specific jurisdiction as being "two points on a sliding scale").
183. See O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 321 (explaining the Third Circuit’s will not adopt the
sliding scale approach employed by other circuits).
184. See id. at 321 (finding that the variability inherent in the "hybrid approaches" was
undesirable).
185. See id. (explaining that "the ‘sliding scale,’ ‘substantial connection,’ and
‘discernible relationship’ test are not the law in [the Third C]ircuit").
186. Id.
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Circuit opined in O’Connor that, as a result of using a hybrid approach,
"[g]eneral and specific jurisdiction merge, and the result is a freewheeling
totality-of-the-circumstances test. Our cases, however, have always treated
general and specific jurisdiction as analytically distinct categories, not two
points on a sliding scale."187
To the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court clearly made two distinctions.
If the defendant makes systematic and continuous "affiliations" with the
forum, then general jurisdiction is found.188 On the other hand, if the
defendant’s contacts are anything less than the general standard, then "at
least one contact must give rise or relate to the plaintiff’s claim."189 When
using hybrid approaches, the court determined that "all factors come
together in ‘a sort of jurisdictional stew.’"190 The Third Circuit’s reasoning
is persuasive because adopting a test that does not confine contacts to two
discernable spheres fails to place defendants on notice of where they stand.
As a result, they would not be able to, as the Third Circuit says, "control
their jurisdictional exposure."191
The Third Circuit Applies a Qualified or Heightened "But For" Test
In the end, the Third Circuit opined that the but for test was the better
test to "preserve the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction,"
since "[b]ut-for cause does not shift with the strength of the defendant’s
contacts, nor does it slide along a continuum. Rather it draws a bright line
separating the related from the unrelated."192 The court reasoned, however,
that the but for test has its weaknesses and therefore it requires a more
"direct causal connection."193 Primarily, the court found the test can be
over-inclusive, explaining, "[The but for test] has . . . no limiting principle;
187. Id.
188. See O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 321 n.10 ("Whatever the merits of [a sliding scale test]
it is clear that a fairly sharp dichotomy between [specific and general jurisdiction] still
expresses the view of the Supreme Court." (quoting EUGENE F. SCOLES, ET AL, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 306 (West Publishing Co., 4th ed., 2004)).
189. Id. at 321 (emphasis added).
190. Id. (citing Mary Twitchell, Burnham and Constitutionally Permissible Levels of
Harm, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 659, 666 (1991)).
191. Id. ("As long as out-of-state residents refrain from continuous and substantial
forum contacts, they can conduct their affairs ‘confident that transactions in one context will
not come back to haunt them unexpectedly in another.’"). The court further held: "A
standard so formless has no place in our relatedness inquiry." Id. at 322.
192. Id. at 322.
193. O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 323.
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it literally embraces every event that hindsight can logically identify in the
causative claim."194 The court admonished that but for causes must have a
"meaningful relationship" to the "scope of the ‘benefits and protection’
received from the forum;" and, therefore, since some but for causes "do not
relate to their effects in a jurisdictionally significant way," the relatedness
inquiry cannot end with ascertaining a but for cause alone.195 "If but for
causation sufficed, then defendants’ jurisdictional obligations would bear
no meaningful relationship to the scope of the ‘benefits and protection’
received from the forum. As a result, the relatedness inquiry cannot stop at
but for causation."196 Therefore, the court answered the dilemma by
buttressing the but for test with the reciprocity principle (or the "quid pro
quo" principle) found in Burger King:
The causal connection can be somewhat looser than the tort concept of
proximate causation, but it must nonetheless be intimate enough to keep
the quid pro quo proportional and personal jurisdiction reasonably
197
foreseeable.

The court began its analysis starting with Mr. O’Connor’s affidavit.
Mr. O’Connor claimed that he relied on the brochures when he made the
spa treatment appointment.198 On this basis, the court concluded, "but for
the mailing of the brochure, Mr. O’Connor never would have purchased a
massage, and he would not have suffered a massage-related injury."199 In
addition, consistent with its ruling that but for analysis needed something
more substantial, the court further found that the reciprocity principle was

194. Id. at 322.
195. Id. at 322–23.
196. Id. at 322 (criticizing the Second Circuit’s use of a sliding scale).
197. Id. at 323 ("We thus hold that specific jurisdiction requires a closer and more
direct causal connection than that provided by the but-for test."). The Court continued:
"But in the course of this necessarily fact-sensitive inquiry, the analysis should
hew closely to the reciprocity principle upon which specific jurisdiction rests."
The relatedness requirement’s function is to maintain balance in this reciprocal
exchange. In order to do so, it must keep the jurisdictional exposure that results
from a contact closely tailored to that contact’s accompanying substantive
obligations."
Id.
198. See O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 323 (explaining that Sandy Lane’s solicitation is a "but
for" cause of O’Connor’s injury because O’Connor claims he received massage treatment
"‘as a result’ of Sandy Lane’s solicitation").
199. Id. at 323.

"Arise out of" or "Related to"

445

satisfied.200 It found that Sandy Lane availed itself of Pennsylvania’s
commercial laws and through the mailings and phone calls formed a
contract for spa services.201 Because the mailings and phone calls were in
furtherance of a contract from which the defendant benefited, with "those
rights came accompanying obligations."202 Those obligations included an
implied contractual promise by Sandy Lane to exercise due care when
performing the spa services.203
Although the O’Connors’ claims involved a tort not a contract, the
court found that Sandy Lane breached a social duty not to act with
negligence:
Our relatedness analysis, however, requires neither proximate causation
nor substantive relevance. It is enough that a meaningful link exists
between a legal obligation that arose in the forum and the substance of
the plaintiffs’ claims. The O’Connors claim Sandy Lane breached a duty
that is identical to a contractual duty assumed by the hotel in
Pennsylvania. So intimate a link justifies the exercise of specific
jurisdiction as a quid pro quo for Sandy Lane’s enjoyment of the right to
204
form binding contracts in Pennsylvania.

Based on this analysis, the court held that the O’Connors’ claims
"‘arise out of or relate to’ Sandy Lane’s Pennsylvania contacts."205
PART IV: Interpreting The Phrases "Arise Out Of" Or "Related To"
Through "Objectified Interpretation" And Offering a Four-Step Approach
to Resolving Personal Jurisdiction Questions
Textualism has traditionally extended to interpretation of statutes,206
constitutions and other legal texts; however, its tenets may shed some light
200. See id. at 323–24 (explaining that Sandy Lane’s solicitation of the O’Connors in
Pennsylvania created rights enjoyed by Sandy Lane and created obligations to the
O’Connors).
201. See id. at 324 (explaining that Sandy Lane created a contract for spa services under
Pennsylvania law "through its mailings and phone calls to Pennsylvania").
202. Id. at 323.
203. See id. (finding that the nature of the contract formed between the parties required
that Sandy Lane "exercise due care in performing the services required").
204. O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 324.
205. Id.
206. See Justice Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
Remarks at The Catholic University of America, "A Theory of Constitutional Interpretation"
(Oct. 18, 1996) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice) (opining on statutory and constitutional textualism).
If you are a textualist, you don’t care about the intent, and I don’t care if the
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here.207 The courts have read the language to mean to apply one test over
the other. Regardless of whether the Court declined to decide whether there
was a distinction, the circuits have certainly focused on the meaning and
application of those terms.208
Obviously, the Supreme Court is constitutionally charged with the
responsibility to interpret the law. A metaphysical view as to what
constitutes "interpreting a law" was well put by Jesuit philosopher Fr.
Austin Fagothy and most closely resembles the conservative jurisprudential
view: "Interpretation of the law is its genuine explanation according to the
mind of the lawgiver."209 In turn, textualism provides that law’s interpreter
should adhere as close to the text as objectionably and as reasonably as
possible.210 The question, however, remains as to how far this should
extend to the reading of case law.
Judge Frank Easterbrook offers that when the textualist looks at
statutory structure he "hear[s] the words as they would sound in the mind of
a skilled, objectively reasonable user of words."211 Rationally, it should be
the same when taking direction from any authority, including a court.
Therefore, in cases where there is much focus on the Court’s teaching,212
framers of the Constitution had some secret meaning in mind when they adopted
its words. I take the words as they were promulgated to the people of the United
States, and what is the fairly understood meaning of those words. I do the same
with statutes, by the way, which is why I don’t use legislative history. The
words are the law.
Id.
207. See Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism? 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005) (explaining the
difference between textualism and intentionalism).
"The most common way of
distinguishing textualism from its principal judicial rival, ‘intentionalism,’ purports to
identify a basic disagreement about the proper goal of statutory interpretation:
intentionalists try to identify and enforce the ‘subjective’ intent of the enacting legislature,
while textualists care only about the ‘objective’ meaning of the statutory text." Id.
208. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415–16 n.10 (detailing that the Supreme Court
declined to decide the distinction between the phrases "arise out of" and "related to").
209. FAGOTHY, supra note 13, at 296.
210. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 23–25 (Princeton Univ. Press, 1997) (explaining that textualism does not require "strict
constructionism" but rather requires interpretation within a word’s "limited range of
meaning").
211. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988) (emphasis added).
212. See Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1187, 1254–55 (explaining the importance placed on written judicial opinions).
In the United States, however, the common law is embarking on a path
towards becoming increasingly textual, just as statutes have been for
hundreds of years. It is no exaggeration to say that in this country, the
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and where there is very little explanation surrounding a clear mandate to a
lower court, such as in the case of specific jurisdiction where the Court is
emphatic that the claim must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s
contact, reading the Court’s instruction as one would a statute,213
objectively and rationally, might yield a clearer and truer result.
common law consists of what judges write in their opinions. What they
think or what they say during the proceedings before them is almost
entirely irrelevant. As a result, it is less and less necessary to search for
the holding or ratio decidendi of a case; the judge writing for the
majority will often specify exactly what the holding is in carefully
crafted text that is meant to fetter the discretion of lower courts in the
same way that a statute does. As a consequence, legal reasoning is
gradually being supplanted by close reading . . . The end result of these
two centuries of development in the United States is that what an
appellate judge says—for example, during or after oral argument—is
completely irrelevant. What matters, for legal purposes, is what judges
write in their opinions. Because the text comes straight from the horse’s
mouth, so to speak, lawyers focus intently on the judges’ exact words.
The practice of having a single majority opinion, when possible, imbues
the text of the opinion with further power, since is it normally no longer
necessary to extract a ratio decidendi from two or more opinions that
reach the same result but differ in their reasoning.
Id.
213. See id. at 1254–55 (explaining the new approach taken by the Supreme Court in
developing multi-part or multi-prong tests to assist lower courts and the view among lower
courts of Supreme Court opinions as being akin to statutes). The author explains:
The observation that the Supreme Court has become inclined to set clear
guidelines for lower courts to follow, often via multi-part tests, is not
novel. Robert Nagel has observed the tendency of the Court during the
past few decades to use a "formulaic style" of opinion writing in
constitutional cases, a style that makes much use of "elaborately layered
sets of ‘tests’ or ‘prongs’ or ‘requirements’ or ‘standards’ or ‘hurdles.’"
He suggests that the elaborateness and detail of the formulae in
constitutional cases is "an obvious effort to achieve control and
consistency." Unlike an earlier era, where judges were subject to
"simple and undefined maxims," modern courts are bound by "rules that
are specific and multiple." Frederick Schauer has also addressed the
notion that modern judicial opinions, especially in constitutional cases,
"read more like statutes than like opinions of a court." Schauer’s view is
that it is especially courts lower in the hierarchy that are likely to
interpret a judicial opinion like a statute: "It is not what the Supreme
Court held that matters, but what it said . . . . One good quote is worth a
hundred clever analyses of the holding." The language of an opinion
therefore "takes on a special significance" in the lower courts and
"operates like a statute." As a consequence, the opinion’s language "will
be carefully analyzed, and discussions of why one word rather than
another was used will be common."
Id.
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The Third Circuit’s Test is Supported by a Natural Reading of the Text
There are several classifications of textualism, but the purpose of this
article is not to argue which one is better or more pure than the other.214
Professor John Manning, in keeping with the judicial philosophy of Justice
Scalia and Judge Easterbrook, argues that textualism focuses on
"‘objectified intent’—the import that a reasonable person conversant with
applicable social and linguistic conventions would attach to the enacted
words."215
Here, when dealing with case law we can apply interpretatio
objectificata, or the "objectified interpretation" standard, which is akin to
the "objective intent" standard.216 Lower courts arguably "interpret" case
law from the Supreme Court and, in order to be rational and fair to the
Court’s teaching, that interpretation should be objective and rationaliter
lectum, "rationally read." Because the terms "arise out of" and "related to"
present a paradox in context, one must proceed by applying other
interpretive tools.217 Therefore, starting with a dictionary definition, the
terms "arise out of" mean that the claim must arise, or "come into being" (to
originate from a particular source or natural consequence) from the
contact.218 In turn, the terms "related to" mean, in the context of the entire
214. See Elliot M. Davis, Note, The Newer Textualism: Justice Alito’s Statutory
Interpretation, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 984 (2007) (describing the difference
between Justice Alito’s "newer textualism" and Justice Scalia; where Justice Alito will use
legislative history to establish context); J.T. Hutchins, A New New Textualism: Why
Textualists Should Not Be Originalists, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 110–27 (2007)
(arguing for an "evolutionary" textualism); R. Shep Melnik, Statutory Reconstruction, The
Politics of Eskridge’s Interpretation, 84 GEO. L.J. 91, 96 (1995) (reviewing and quoting
Eskridge’s "dynamic textualism" as "look[ing] forward to the contemporary world’s "values
and social needs" and to "unforeseen circumstances’" (WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994))).
215. John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 424
(2005).
216. See id.at 433 (explaining "objectified intent" as a "concept predicated on the
notion that a judge should read a statutory text as a reasonable person conversant with
applicable social conventions when read").
217. See Barnhart. v. Sigmon Coal, Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 461 (2002) (explaining that
analysis begins with the language of the text to determine whether it has "plain and
unambiguous meaning" at which point the inquiry ceases). If that fails, then the analysis
proceeds through the application of "other canons or interpretive tool[s]." See also MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227 (1994) (explaining the Court’s
utilization of the dictionary definitions to assist in resolving an ambiguity in 47 U.S.C.S.
203(b)(2)).
218. See THE NEW WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 50 (Int’l Ed.
1989) ("Whether certain events ‘arise out of’ a nonresident defendant’s actions within Puerto
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sentence, claims that relate or are associated (the way in which one thing is
associated with another; to show nor establish a logical or causal
connection between) to a defendant’s activities within the forum state.219
This suggests a more relaxed standard than the former. Therefore, the
result is that sometimes specific jurisdiction can be found through a more
direct, intimate relationship between a contact and a claim, and at other
times, a looser relationship between a contact and a claim is warranted.
One reading of the text calls for using two separate tests. The
proximate cause and but for tests could be used, as it is now, in separate,
exclusive applications.220 The inconsistent results in doing so, however, are
apparent in the present circuit split. Applying a proximate cause test to the
contacts and claims in either Nowak or O’Connor, for instance, would not
yield jurisdiction, because the advertisements were not intimate (no
proximity) to the tort claim. As discussed above, this is the problem with
applying proximate cause alone. The test is too restrictive, because the
advertisements still had a causal link to the claims in those cases. On the
other hand, applying the but for test to the circumstances in Nowak and
O’Connor would yield a finding for jurisdiction; but, notwithstanding the
Third Circuit’s qualified version, the problem with the but for test, as the
Third Circuit says, is that it is over-inclusive,221 where unfettered
application could result in hauling an unwary defendant into court from
contacts too attenuated to the claim.
A second way to keep specific and general jurisdiction distinct would
be to apply both the proximate cause test and the but for test consecutively
within an analysis. The problem here is that if at first the proximate-cause
test yielded a negative result for jurisdiction and a subsequent application of
the but for test yielded a positive result for jurisdiction on the same facts
Rico is comparable or analogous to whether certain actions can be said to be the legal, or
proximate cause of injuries suffered by a plaintiff."); see also Pizzaro, 907 F.2d at 1259
(explaining the nature of defendant’s negligence must have "arose out of" defendant’s
contacts with Puerto Rico to establish in personam jurisdiction over the defendants).
219. See THE NEW WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 840 (Int’l Ed.
1989); see also THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 588 (Pocket Ed. 1974); MerriamWebster’s Online Dictionary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (11th Ed. 2009) http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/relate; see also Leocal v. Ashcroft, 125 S.Ct. 377, 382 ("When
interpreting, we must give words their ‘ordinary or natural’ meaning.").
220. See Braham Boyce Ketcham, Note, Related Contacts for Specific Personal
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Defendants: Adopting a Two-Part Test, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 477, 492–96 (2009) (arguing that a disjunctive reading yields a two part
test).
221. See O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 322 (criticizing the but for test as lacking a limiting
principle).
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and circumstances, the application of the but for test will render the
proximate cause test superfluous. As a result, applying the two tests
consecutively would simply make the relevant test the looser one.
There is another, more natural reading of the language which suggests
something in between a strict connection and a looser one. It suggests a test
that is broad enough to separate the related from the unrelated, while
limiting any over-inclusive effects. The Third Circuit test compensates for
but for’s inherent limitless application and thus, is consistent with a natural
reading of the "arise out of or related to" language.222 When it articulated
its version of the test, the court opined that while the but for test "draws a
bright-line . . . between the related and un-related," it cautioned against the
test’s "overinclusiveness."223 Therefore, in order to separate the related
from the unrelated while applying the but for test, a court should examine
whether the "causal connection [is] . . . intimate enough to keep the quid
pro quo proportional and personal jurisdiction reasonably foreseeable."224
There has been some criticism that the Third Circuit test concentrates
too much on causality.225 The Third Circuit is in good company because
causality is what most courts use to establish specific jurisdiction226 and the
concept appears to be the only means to keep the spheres of specific and
general separate.227 Further, there is a claim that the Third Circuit rejected
the but for test.228 This assertion is incorrect. The Third Circuit did not

222. See id. at 323 (explaining that the causal connection must be close enough "to keep
the quid pro quo proportional and personal jurisdiction reasonable foreseeable"); see also
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 331–32 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("The Court and the dissent criticize me for suggesting that there is only one
reading of the text.") "They are both mistaken. I assert only that mine is the natural reading
of the statute (i.e., the normal reading), not that it is the only conceivable one." Id. Leocal v.
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004) (reasoning that, "[w]hen interpreting . . . we must give words
their ‘ordinary or natural’ meaning").
223. O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 322.
224. Id. at 323.
225. See Jonathan P. Diffley, Note, Spa-cific Jurisdiction: A Massage in Barbados
Perpetuates Improper Analysis of Personal Jurisdiction in U.S. Courts, 58 CATH. U. L. REV.
305, 329 (2008) ("At its outset, the O’Connor approach overemphasized the issue of
causation, making it the threshold factor in the relatedness requirement inquiry.").
226. See Flavio Rose, Comment, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction: The
"But-For" Test, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1545, 1577 (1994) ("The notion of a causal relationship
between the contacts and plaintiff ’s injury is present in many judicial opinions, even if no
specific type of causation is discussed.").
227. See Diffley, supra note 225, at 323 (observing that the Third Circuit acknowledged
that the but for test keeps the doctrines of specific and general jurisdiction separate).
228. See id. (noting that there is no limiting structure in the casualty chain).
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reject the but for test, but however criticized its "overinclusiveness."229 It
regarded the test as a starting point from which a court should arguably do
what it is designed to do—make a decision as to whether the defendant had
a legal obligation to the plaintiff as a result of its contacts with the forum.230
There has also been criticism that the Third Circuit did not hew closely to
the teachings of Burger King.231 The argument is that the Third Circuit
overreached when it dismissed the substantial connection test as a hybrid
that confused the lines between specific and general jurisdiction.232
To the contrary, the Third Circuit observed all the teachings of the
Court and is unerring in its disregard of the "substantial connection" test as
one that fails to keep the quid pro quo proportional.233 The focus should be
on the defendant and its actions toward the forum’s citizens.234 The Court
in World-Wide Volkswagen, was clear: the question is whether "the
229. See id. at 322 (discussing various overinclusive situations when applying the but
for test).
230. See O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 321–22 (noting that "courts must decide each case
individually" and refraining from adopting a mechanical test).
231. See Diffley, supra note 225, at 327–28 (arguing that the Burger King court
"determine[d] whether the [defendant’s] contact had substantial connections with the forum
state" and "refused to be bogged down by analysis of whether the relationship between the
defendants’ contacts with the forum state and the plaintiff’s claims were casually
connected"). The Court made no such assertion that there should be no casual connection
between a defendant’s contacts with the forum, as Burger King was a case in contract thus
obviating the need to find causality. Id. at 327–28. See also Linda Sandstrom Simard,
Hybrid Personal Jurisdiction: It’s Not General Jurisdiction, or Specific Jurisdiction, But Is
It Constitutional? 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 559, 579 (1998) ("[T]he Court has given little
indication of the jurisdictional characteristics that might justify the exercise of specific
jurisdiction in the absence of a causal nexus."). Arguably, there could have been not specific
but general jurisdiction over Audi, since the citizens of Oklahoma were not involved. Id. at
579–80.
232. See Rose, supra note 226, at 328 (concluding that the Third Circuit overreached).
233. See id. at 326 ("The O’Connor opinion correctly analyzed and rejected the
proximate cause and but-for tests."); but see Jayne S. Ressler, Plausibly Pleading Personal
Jurisdiction, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 627, 641 (2009) (criticizing the substantial connection test’s
lack of the causal element, turning it into a sliding scale); Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts
and Personal Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1444, 1461 (1988) (contending in context of
products liability cases that finding for specific jurisdiction because similar products are
present in the forum can blur the line between specific and general jurisdiction). In an
analysis of "hybrid approaches," Professor Twitchell uses the metaphor of a recipe that by
combining "a little purposefulness, a little relatedness, a little convenience and some state
interest [you have] fair jurisdiction, even if the case falls outside the contours of specific and
general jurisdiction as they have been defined by courts and commentators." Mary
Twitchell, Burnham and Constitutionally Permissible Levels of Harm, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 659,
666 (1991).
234. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (finding that the focus should be on
the defendant and its actions toward the forum’s citizens).
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defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being hauled into court there" as "critical to
due process analysis."235 Similarly in Burnham v. Superior Court,236 Justice
Scalia described "uncertainty and unnecessary litigation over the
preliminary issue of the forum’s competence" as "evils."237 Predictability
should be the goal of jurisdictional rules.
A Formulaic Depiction of Jurisdictional Analysis
Taking into account the teachings of all the case law discussed herein,
a four-step process is postulated as a uniform method to determine
jurisdiction. At Step 1, the inquiry should center on whether the defendant
"purposely availed" itself of the legal protections and benefits of the forum
state.238 At Step 2, a court should analyze whether the contacts are causally
related to the claims, using the Third Circuit’s qualified but for test.239 If
the test is positive for jurisdiction, then under Step 3, a court should
determine reasonableness.240 Finally, under Step 4, if the test instead

235. Id. The Court denied jurisdiction in the in the forum state of Oklahoma because
the defendants decided against serving, either directly or indirectly, the Oklahoma market for
their product. Id. at 295. The defendants were a New York car dealership and New York
distributor that served solely the New York market. Id. at 288–89. The automobile involved
in the accident was sold to the customer in New York, but found its way to Oklahoma via
the customer’s "unilateral activity," not by any effort on the part of the defendants to reach
the Oklahoma market with their products. Id. at 298. See also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that WorldWide Volkswagen "rejected the assertion that a consumer’s unilateral act of bringing the
defendant’s product into the forum State was a sufficient constitutional basis for personal
jurisdiction over the defendant").
236. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 626 (1990) (finding that the Due
Process Clause does not prohibit courts from exercising jurisdiction over petitioner based on
in-state service); see also Cote v. Wadel, 796 F. 2d 981, 983 (1986) ("Jurisdictional rules
should be as simple as possible, so that the time of the litigants and judges is not wasted
deciding where a case should be brought and so that fully litigated cases are not set at
naught . . . because a subtle jurisdictional bar was overlooked until the appeal. . . .").
237. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 626.
238. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472 (noting that the defendant must have
"purposely directed [its] activities at the forum").
239. See O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 323 (describing its test).
240. See Ressler, supra note 233, at 635 (explaining that courts typically use a threepronged test to determine whether sufficient contacts exist to confer specific jurisdiction and
that one of those prongs is a reasonableness requirement).
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produces a negative result, the contacts would be examined under general
jurisdiction analysis.241
Before proceeding with the four-step jurisdiction analysis, the
following legal formulae are offered to visualize the various concepts
involved in that analysis. While these are not the only formulae that could
be derived, they represent the major elements necessary to determine
jurisdiction. The case law discussed heretofore combined with the Third
Circuit test can be reduced to this equation242 for specific jurisdiction:
J = Pmc + T + R
Jurisdiction (J) equals purposeful minimum contacts (Pmc) + Third
Circuit test (qualified but for) variable (T) + reasonableness (R).
For general jurisdiction, the following postulations are suggested,
where J = jurisdiction, Csc = continuous and systematic contacts, H =
Helicopteros, and P = Perkins:
If Csc  P, then J.
If Csc  H, then not J.243
If continuous and systematic contacts are greater than or equal to
Perkins,244 then jurisdiction should be found. If continuous and systematic
contacts are less than or equal to Helicopteros,245 then no jurisdiction
should be found. To recapitulate, in Perkins the defendant conducted his
entire business in Ohio, including maintaining an office there, keeping
office files, bank accounts, holding directors meetings, and supervising
operations from there.246 Contrastingly, in Helicopteros, the contacts with
Texas were fewer in number.247 They consisted of, but were not limited to,
purchases of 80% of its fleet of helicopters, purchases of supplies, sending
pilots to training, sending management to Texas for training, and receiving
approximately $5 million in payments drawn upon a Houston bank. 248

241. See infra note 272 and accompanying text (explaining the substantial contacts
analysis for general jurisdiction by the Court in Del Ponte).
242. The use of algebraic formulas to reduce certain legal concepts to mathematical
elements may assist at times in applying the law to facts in a given situation. Here, the Third
Circuit test supplants the "arise out of" or "related to" requirement in Helicopteros.
243. Since analyzing jurisdiction is fact-sensitive, there may be cases where the amount
of contacts may be one more or one less in either case. The result can be no jurisdiction if
applying strictly or perhaps a reasonably close standard could be applied to find jurisdiction.
244. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447–48 (describing contacts).
245. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 411–12 (describing contacts).
246. See supra text accompanying note 29 (describing jurisdiction analysis in Perkins).
247. See supra text accompanying note 29 (describing jurisdictional analysis in
Helicopteros).
248. See id. (explaining the contacts defendant had in Helicopteros).
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A Four Step Approach to Determine Jurisdiction

Based on the above formulae, the four-step approach is applied in the
analysis below using the fact pattern in Del Ponte.
Determine Purposeful Contacts
The first step requires the determination of a defendant’s contacts
purposefully directed to the forum state.249 Under the above formula, the
representative variables at this step are Pmc (purposeful minimum
contacts). To find the elements, there must be a deliberate targeting of the
forum—a reaching in by the defendant, keeping in mind that "unilateral
activity of those who claim some relationship with a non-resident
defendant" is insufficient as well as contacts with a state’s citizens taking
place outside the state.250
Ray Art’s contacts were relatively small in number, reduced to
purchasing some of its inventory from New York vendors and annual visits
by its principals to the state.251 The court calculated the purchases to be a
third of its inventory over five years.252 Assuming the court’s five-year
historical value and accepting, for now, its conclusion that these contacts
evidenced purposeful availment,253 the analysis moves to Step 2.
Apply the Third Circuit Test for Specific Jurisdiction
The Third Circuit opined that the problems with hybrid approaches,
particularly sliding scale tests, "vary the scope of the relatedness

249. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 ("[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State."); see also O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317 (noting that specific
jurisdiction has three parts starting with determining purposeful availment); Moki Mac River
Expeditions, 221 S.W.3d at 577 ("[T]he facts alleged must indicate that the seller intended to
serve the Texas market.").
250. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 ("The unilateral activity of those who claim some
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the
forum State.").
251. See Del Ponte, 2008 WL 169358, at *5–7 (describing contacts).
252. See id. at *5 (“[J]urisdictional discovery has demonstrated that Ray-Art has
purchased nearly a third of its inventory over a five-year period from New York vendors.”).
253. See id. at *11 (“In light of all of these considerations, including the stage at which
this case rests, Plaintiff has established sufficient minimum contacts.”).
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requirement" and thus, merge personal and general jurisdiction.254 Thus,
identifying a but for cause is necessary to draw "a bright line separating the
related from the unrelated."255 Arguably, any test which fails to recognize
the causation element blurs the line between specific and general
jurisdiction.256
The Third Circuit approach compensates for that.257 To reiterate, it
held that "specific jurisdiction requires a closer and more direct causal
connection than that provided by the but for test alone."258 The court
opined that the but for test needed to account for the defendant’s intentions:
Whether there was an intimate causal connection to "keep the quid pro quo
proportional and personal jurisdiction reasonably foreseeable."259 In
O’Connor, the court first found evidence of reaching in by the defendant to
target Pennsylvania’s citizens and availing itself to the protections of
Pennsylvania law to make contracts in Pennsylvania.260 A contract was
formed through the mailings and phone calls to the O’Connors such that
there existed a "meaningful link . . . between a legal obligation that arose in
the forum and the substance of the plaintiffs’ claims."261 The court further
held that even though the O’Connors’ claims "sounded in tort" the
254. O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 321; see also Simard, supra note 231, at 581 (contending
that the sliding-scale has "an inherent tendency to dilute jurisdictional requirements"). "[I]t
seems that theoretically and pragmatically the categories of general and specific jurisdiction
should be considered separate and distinct from each other rather than merely as the two
extreme on a continuum of contacts." Id. at 581. See also Diffley, supra note 231, at 328
(arguing that "the sliding-scale test that the Third Circuit condemned clearly defies the
personal jurisdiction doctrine").
255. O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 321; see also Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 579
(acknowledging that most courts have interpreted relatedness to require a causal
connection); but see Ketcham, supra note 220, at 492–96 (arguing against adopting the
Third Circuit test as a national standard since it focuses on causality and for a test which
simply requires a direct relationship where a causal relationship is not necessary, disagreeing
with most courts).
256. See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 583 (noting that even the sliding scale jurisdictional
analysis presents a number of problems such as blurring the distinction between general and
specific jurisdiction); see also Maloney, supra note 67, at 1299–1300 (discussing the impact
of the but for test).
257. See O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 321 (finding that identifying a but for cause is
necessary to draw a bright line separating the related from the unrelated).
258. Id. at 323; see also Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 581 (noting that "[a]lthough the
Shute court posited that the required reasonableness inquiry would act as a check on the but
for test’s expansiveness, commentators have questioned the efficacy of the reasonableness
safeguard, calling it ‘highly deferential’" (citations omitted)).
259. Id.
260. See id. (discussing defendant’s contacts with Pennsylvania).
261. Id. at 323–24.
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defendant had a binding social duty to act without negligence, which was
identical to the contractual duty they assumed in the forum state.262
If the "but for" test were applied in a case like Del Ponte, "but for
defendant’s purchases of jewelry in New York, the sale in Florida would
not have occurred," while applying the Third Circuit’s limiting principle
that the causal connection be intimate enough to keep the quid pro quo
proportional and personal jurisdiction reasonably foreseeable, personal
jurisdiction would not be established. Mere purchases of jewelry263 by the
defendant in New York have no "meaningful link . . . of a legal obligation
that arose in the forum [New York] and the substance of plaintiff’s claim
[injury to the child]."264 The defendant was not targeting the Del Pontes’
through those purchases, and therefore, formed no contract with them in
New York. The necklace was sold in Florida and the injury occurred in
New York. As the Third Circuit reasoned: "Contact with vacationing
Pennsylvanians is no substitute for contact with Pennsylvania . . . . A
Philadelphia vendor may sell a lot of cheese-steaks to German tourists, but
that does not mean he has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of
conducting activities within Germany."265
Furthermore, there is a
reasonable probability that the offending necklace came from
Pennsylvania.266 As a result, specific jurisdiction under Step 2 arguably
should not be found.
Determine Whether It Would Be Reasonable to Subject the Defendant to
Jurisdiction.
If Step 2 yields a positive result, then the analysis would move to
whether exercising jurisdiction would offend "traditional notions of fair
262. See id. at 324 (describing duty).
263. See D’Jamoos v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 104 (3d Cir. 2009) (describing
contacts). "Pilatus’s direct contacts within Pennsylvania . . . are limited to: (1) sending two
employees to Pennsylvania to view displays at a potential supplier, and (2) purchasing $
1,030,139 in goods or services from suppliers in Pennsylvania during the five-year period
preceding this litigation." Id. (emphasis added).
264. O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 324; see also Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 298 (3rd
Cir. 2007) (holding that in order to have jurisdiction either under personal jurisdiction
analysis or the effects test the plaintiff must show that the defendant intentionally aimed his
conduct toward the forum and knew that the plaintiff would suffer injury because of that
tortuous conduct).
265. O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 318.
266. See Del Ponte, 2008 WL 169358 at 11 (noting the uncertainty over the origin of
the necklace).
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play and substantial justice."267 Once minimum contacts are established, a
court should presume jurisdiction, but the defendant can then rebut the
presumption.268 The defendant has the burden to show a compelling reason
why jurisdiction would be unreasonable, which is a high burden to meet.269
Courts consider several factors when deciding whether it is reasonable to
subject a defendant to jurisdiction: "[T]he burden on the defendant, the
forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief, the [non-resident] judicial
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies,"270 and "[t]he procedural and substantive interests of other
nations."271 Here, Step 2 failed to establish any existence of minimum
contacts, rendering the reasonableness inquiry unnecessary. By inputting
all the variables, the formula, J = Pmc + T + R, would produce a sum-zero
for specific jurisdiction. Therefore, the analysis moves to general
jurisdiction.
General Jurisdiction is a Constitutionally Separate Consideration
Before analyzing this step, it is important to note that the court in Del
Ponte specifically did not reach the question of general jurisdiction.272 It
reasoned that since the Supreme Court did not specifically say that large
amounts of purchases by Helicopteros within Texas failed to satisfy specific
jurisdiction analysis, there is no reason why those contacts could not satisfy
specific jurisdiction analysis under their sliding scale test.273 Further, in
arriving at its conclusion that there was specific jurisdiction over the
defendant as a result of using the sliding scale, the court seemed to ignore
267. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (internal citations omitted).
268. See O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 324 ("The existence of minimum contacts makes
jurisdiction presumptively constitutional, and the defendant ‘must present a compelling case
that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.’"
(citations omitted)).
269. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (opining that if the reasonableness factors weigh
more in favor of jurisdiction that may lessen the level of contacts that would normally be
required).
270. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
271. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113, 115 (1987).
272. See Del Ponte, 2008 WL 169358, at *10 (noting that the court can find substantial
contacts with the forum without general jurisdiction).
273. See id. at *6 n.2 ("The court in Helicopteros did not decide whether a large volume
of purchases would be sufficient to satisfy specific personal jurisdiction—it merely
determined that purchases from the forum were insufficient to satisfy the higher threshold
required of general personal jurisdiction.")
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the fact that both parties in Helicopteros conceded specific jurisdiction did
not lie.274 The Del Ponte court’s answer, however, was to find for
jurisdiction only because Ray Art made some purchases of jewelry in New
York.275 This would not be the result under general jurisdiction analysis.
In Del Ponte, the defendant purchased nearly a third of its jewelry
from vendors in New York, but only over a five year period.276 Similarly,
the defendants in Helicopteros bought 80% of its aircraft fleet and supplies
in Texas over a seven-year period.277 Thus, under the formula, "If Ccs  H,
then not J," general jurisdiction would not be found in Del Ponte because
the only contacts involved are the jewelry purchases from New York, which
is far less than 80% of the helicopter purchases in Helicopteros between
1970 and 1977, let alone the other contacts, such as the visit by Helicol’s
president, the reception of payments, and the training of the crew.278 While
both helicopter and jewelry purchases are "business-related," the Supreme
Court held in Helicopteros that "business relation" alone was too attenuated
to the injury.279
Ray Art does not own any real estate in New York and has no dealers
or retail outlets within the state.280 It does not engage in any direct
advertising or sales of its products to consumers in New York.281 Ray Art
does not pay business or other taxes in New York. It has not advertised in
New York, has no agents or representatives there, and has not participated

274. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415–16 ("All parties to the present case concede
that respondents’ claims against [the defendant] did not ‘arise out of,’ and are not related to,
[the defendant’s] activities within Texas."). The Court concluded that "[w]e thus must ….
determine whether they constitute the kind of continuous and systematic general business
contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins." Id. The Court held that they do not. Id.
275. See Del Ponte, 2008 WL 169358, at *4 (finding jurisdiction).
276. See id. at *13 (describing purchases).
277. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 411 (describing purchases).
278. See id. at 410–11 (noting other contacts of defendant).
279. See id. at 411 (noting that the defendant never performed helicopter operations in
Texas or sold any product that reached Texas, never solicited business in Texas . . . and
never recruited an employee in Texas); see also Del Ponte, 2008 2008 WL 169358, at *3
(presenting Defendant’s argument that the magistrate judge overlooked Helicopteros’
precepts that mere purchases and related trips are not enough to assert jurisdiction over a
corporate defendant).
280. See generally Del Ponte, 2008 WL 169358, at *1–13 (failing to address Ray Art’s
ownership of real estate and retail outlets in New York).
281. See id. at *4 (“While percentage of business is typically measured by sales in the
forum, purchases from companies located in New York can also demonstrate regular
business dealings with the forum.”).
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in any shows, exhibits, or competitions in the forum state.282 Because Ray
Art’s contacts were not continuous and systematic enough to indicate that it
purposely availed itself to protections and benefits of New York, general
jurisdiction should not be found.
PART V: Conclusion
Specific and general jurisdiction are constitutionally distinctive and
involve separate analyses.283 Circuits that exclusively use the "proximate
cause" test when determining specific jurisdiction may find it difficult to
apply in all circumstances. Conversely, circuits that exclusively adopt the
but for test may find it easier to apply in all circumstances. The problem
there is that indiscriminate application of the but for test may at times result
in jurisdiction over a defendant with contacts too attenuated to the claims.
On the other hand, sliding scale tests blur the divide between the two, as the
Third Circuit opines, and make it even more difficult to place a potential
defendant on notice as to when they could be hauled into court.
The Third Circuit’s qualified but for test for jurisdiction, however, as a
result of "objectified interpretation," is supported by a natural reading of the
"arise out of" or "related to" language from Helicopteros.284 It allows for
jurisdiction in cases where the contacts fail to establish a proximate cause to
the claim but nonetheless were a foreseeable consequence of the
defendant’s activity.285 As a result, the test is in harmony with Supreme
Court precedent that there remain two dichotomous spheres of jurisdiction;
and, it is a more effective barometer to use to place defendants on notice of
where they stand.
Substantial justice tempered by fair play is at the heart of due
process.286 Until the High Court decides whether to take up the issue again,
the several circuits remain divided. What is certain is that having a variety
of approaches creates a daunting task for defendants to ascertain the
282. See generally Del Ponte, 2008 WL 169358 at *1–13 (failing to address Ray Art’s
advertising in New York).
283. See supra note 272 and accompanying text (explaining that the Court can find
substantial contacts with forum without general jurisdiction).
284. See supra notes 192–205 and accompanying text (explaining the Third Circuit’s
application of a qualified or heightened "but for" test).
285. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (describing when the exercise of
jurisdiction in proper).
286. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 ("[D]ue process requires only that . . . he have
certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." (internal quotes omitted)).
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boundaries of their activity, thus necessitating the adoption of a uniform
standard. Therefore, courts throughout the land should take another look at
the Third Circuit test and consider adopting it within their purview.

